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I. INTRODUCTION
The classical landlord-tenant relationship has undergone a substantial transformation since its origin in feudal England. The most recent and far-reaching change has been the emergence of an implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases.' An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions recognizes this implied warranty either by statute2 or
judicial decisions or both. These same jurisdictions, however, uniformly
1. See generally Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes, and Tenant Remedies: An Integration, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1976); Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of

Habitabilityin Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979).
2. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 56 and accompanying text. These decisions also have adopted the contrac-
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have rejected an extension of the underlying rationale to the commercial setting by refusing to imply an analogous warranty of fitness or
suitability in nonresidential leases.4 Consequently, while modern notions of consumer protection have made rapid advances in residential
tenancies, commercial lease law continues to be dominated by principles of property which originated in medieval times and have not been
altered significantly since that time.'
This dichotomy has been criticized by several commentators who
see little reason for continuing the distinction between residential and
commercial leases.6 Applying the protections afforded the residential
leaseholder to the commercial tenant involves three distinct, yet interrelated, issues. The broadest question is whether an analogous warranty
of suitability or fitness should be implied in the commercial setting. A
closely related issue concerns the interrelation of the covenants, both
express and implied, in the commercial lease. While all nonresidential
lease covenants traditionally have been considered independent,7 one
way to expand the tenant's remedies in the commercial field would be
to make all lease covenants dependent. Finally, the issue of whether a
commercial leaseholder should be able to assert the landlord's material
breach of any of these covenants as a defense in a summary action for
dispossession must be resolved.
This Note will examine the development of residential leasehold
protections in order to isolate the underlying rationales that have
prompted judicial and legislative action. Part II traces the history of
residential leases, while Part III sets forth the development of commercial lease law. A close examination of these two areas of lease law
reveals that the factors significant in the residential setting are not as
compelling in the commercial field.8 In addition, certain disadvantages
tual notion of mutually dependent covenants and have allowed the residential tenant to assert the
landlord's breach of any lease covenant, whether express or implied, in a summary dispossession
proceeding.
4. See cases cited infra note 69. They also have rejected the other two prongs of residential
protection. See infra notes 59, 66 and accompanying text.
5. See Greenfield & Margolies, An Implied Warranty of Fitness in Nonresidential Leases,
45 ALB. L. REv. 855, 855-56 (1981); Note, Modernizing Commercial Lease Law: The Case for an
Implied Warranty of Fitness, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 929, 930 n.5 (1985); see also Comment, Landlord-Tenant: The Medieval Concepts of Feudal Property Law Are Alive and Well in Leases of
Commercial Property in Illinois, 10 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 338 (1977).
6. See Brennan, The Implied Warranty of Fitness in Commercial Leases and the Subrogating Insurance Company, 18 FORUM 683 (1983); Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5; Levinson &
Silver, Do Commercial Property Tenants Possess Warranties of Habitability?, 14 REAL EST. L.J.
59 (1985); Note, Landlord-Tenant-Should a Warranty of Fitness be Implied in Commercial
Leases?, 13 RUTGERS.L.J. 91 (1981); Note, supra note 5; Comment, Commercial Leases: Behind
The Green Door, 12 PAc. L.J. 1067 (1981).
7. See sources cited infra note 12 and cases cited infra note 59.
8. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. See generally R. SCHOSHINsKi, AMERICAN
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that were mildly disquieting in the residential setting have the potential
of becoming significantly detrimental in the nonresidential context.'
For these reasons, Part IV concludes that a comprehensive extension of
residential leasehold protections to the commercial area is unwarranted.
II.

HISTORY OF RESIDENTIAL LEASES

A.

Early Common Law

At common law the lease was essentially a conveyance of an estate
in land, usually either a periodic tenancy or term of years, that included
covenants on both sides of the transaction. 10 In an agrarian setting, the
land assumed primary importance.11 Although the lease was a contractual relationship, the covenants on both sides were treated as independent. 2 Once the landlord made the conveyance, therefore, any breach
of the lease by him would not suspend any of the tenant's independent
obligations, including the payment of rent.13 The tenant's remedy was
to sue in contract because "the breach of such covenant [could] be
readily compensated for in damages."' 4
The lessee was disadvantaged further by the application of the
common-law rule of caveat emptor. With the coming of the industrial
LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT

§ 3:29 (1980).

9. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
10. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8,§ 1:1, at 1-3; Lesar, The Landlord-TenantRelation in
Perspective: From Status to Contract and Back in 900 Years?, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 369-71
(1961); Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict
Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19, 23-24.

11.

See 3A A.

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

Nature of a Lease in New York, 33

12. See J. BRUCE, J.

ELY

& C.

CORNELL

§ 686, at 240 (rev. ed. 1960); Friedman, The

L.Q. 165, 166 (1947).

BOSTICK, MODERN PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS

31

(1984) (stating that the "common law treatment of lease covenants as independent obligations
developed because, from a property law perspective, the landlord fulfills his obligation by conveying a leasehold estate to the tenant"); 3A A. CORBIN, supra note 11, § 686, at 238-40; 1 H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 88 (3d ed. 1939).
13. See, e.g., McArdle v. Courson, 82 Ill.
App. 3d 123, 125, 402 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1980) (applying a strict application of the traditional rule in a modern setting). But see Higgins v. Whiting, 102
N.J.L. 279, 131 A. 879 (1926) (holding that express covenants to pay rent and to heat an apartment

are mutual and dependent). See generally 1 M. FRIEDMAN,

FRIEDMAN ON LEASES

§ 1.1 (2d ed. 1983).

14. Rubens v. Hill, 213 Ill.
523, 534, 72 N.E. 1127, 1130 (1904); see also 1 H. TIFFANY, supra
note 12, § 88. In its purest form, the doctrine of independent covenants treated both the landlord
and tenant the same. Consequently, if the tenant failed to pay rent, the landlord could not take
possession. See, e.g., Brown v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864). With the legislative enactment of an
action for summary dispossession, the landlord could evict the tenant for nonpayment of rent notwithstanding the landlord's own breach of an express lease covenant. See, e.g., Truman v. Rodesch,
168 Ill. App. 304 (1912). This disparate result occurred because the only litigable issue in the
statutory proceeding was that of possession. Accordingly, the tenant could not raise the landlord's
breach as a defense. Rather, consistent with the doctrine of independent covenants, he was forced
to sue on the lease for contractual damages.
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revolution, a majority of the population began to move into cities.

5

As

a direct result, the importance of the land to the tenant became
subordinate to that of the structures on it; the lease became more residential in its use. 6 Many leases began to contain express covenants
about these improvements."7 The tenant who did not bargain for such
terms, however, leased the property with no implied warranties as to its
habitability, condition, or fitness for the tenant's intended use.' 8 This
doctrine had an additional disabling effect on the lessee in that the unfitness of the leased premises could not be used as a defense to an action for rent. 9
The rules of independent covenants and caveat emptor were rational products of the times. Originally, the conveyance of an estate in
land was of primary importance to the lessee in an agricultural society.20 Even when improvements to the real estate assumed greater significance, the courts reasonably could assume that because the tenant
had an opportunity to inspect the premises, he could detect at least the
major defects. Moreover, the tenant presumably had the ability to put
the demised premises into a livable condition. 2' The problem of hidden
defects could be avoided by an express warranty in the lease. If the
tenant failed to secure an express warranty, it was likely that he was
capable of making repairs himself.2 3 In their original applications,
therefore, these rules did not work harsh results.
15.
(1972).

Hicks, The ContractualNature of Real PropertyLeases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443, 448-54

16. Id. at 451.
17. See Lesar, supra note 10, at 372.
18. See, e.g., Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 115, 23 N.E. 126, 127 (1889) (stating that
lessee must "run the risk of [the dwelling's] condition"); see also 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §

3.45, at 34-36 (A. Casner ed. Supp. 1977) [hereinafter 1 A.L.P.];

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.1 comment b (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Since caveat emptor had its origin in

contract law, the courts easily applied it to conveyances of real property because the landlord and
tenant also were assumed to be dealing at arm's length. See generally Hamilton, The Ancient
Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1135, 1156-63 (1931); Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a
Contract or a Conveyance?-A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. URB. L. 649, 672-79 (1975).
19. See, e.g., Arbuckle Realty Trust v. Rosson, 180 Okla. 20, 67 P.2d 444 (1937). See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 18, § 3.45, at 35; discussion supra note 14.
20. See sources cited supra note 11.
21. See 1 A.L.P., supra note 18, § 3.45, at 35; Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 862;
Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Existence of Implied Warranty of Habitabilityor Fitness for Use of Leased Premises, 40 A.L.R.3d 646, 650 (1971).
22. See 1 A.L.P., supra note 18, § 3.45, at 35; Note, supra note 6, at 94.
23. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 5.1 comment b; Love, supra note 10, at 28; Comment,
supra note 6, at 1068 (stating that "given the nature of the lease and the capabilities of the tenant
in feudal-agrarian times, caveat emptor adequately reflected contemporary social concerns regarding the average farm tenant" (footnote omitted)).
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B. Erosion of the Doctrines
1. Judicial Exceptions
As the process of urbanization continued, the foundation of these
common-law property doctrines began to crumble. Accordingly, early in
the nineteenth century, the courts tried to mitigate the harshness of the
doctrine of independent covenants by implying a covenant of quiet enjoyment into residential leases. 4 Under this covenant, the landlord had
an obligation to transfer good title for the term of the lease to the tenant and actual eviction of the tenant by the landlord or by anyone with
paramount title constituted a breach.2 5 Breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment relieved the tenant of his obligation to pay rent.26 In a sense,
this result was consistent with existing doctrine because total eviction
constituted a complete failure of consideration." The strict test applied
by the courts 2s and the limited scope of the covenant, 9 however, combined to provide the lessee with effective protection only for the most
egregious violations."0
The next attack on the notion of the independence of covenants
came in the case of Dyett v. Pendleton.31 The Dyett court held that
"other acts of the landlord going to diminish the enjoyment of the
premises, besides an actual expulsion, will exonerate from the payment
of rent.' '3 2 This case is heralded as the first case to employ the doctrine
of constructive eviction. 3 Because the lessor had interfered with the
24. See Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 861.
25. See J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, supra note 12, at 26-27; Note, supra note 5, at 933.
There is a split of authority on whether the landlord must convey merely the legal right of possession to the tenant (the "English" rule) or must oust any trespassers and put the lessee in actual
possession of the leasehold (the "American" rule). Compare Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 346, 153
S.E. 824 (1930) (following the "American" rule) with Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352,
111 N.W. 359 (1907) (following the "English" rule).
26. See 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 12, § 95; Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 861; see
also State Bank of Chicago v. Wheeler, 146 Ill. App. 568 (1909); Riley v. Hale, 158 Mass. 240, 33
N.E. 491 (1893); Phoenix Land & Improvement Co. v. Seidel, 135 Mo. App. 185, 115 S.W. 1070
(1909); Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926).
27. See Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 861.
28. The tenant had to prove that the interference with his use of the leasehold was substantial and that the landlord or his agent caused the interference. R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 225 (P. Rohan rev. ed. 1986).
29. See Note, supra note 6, at 96. The Note stated that "this implied covenant provided no
remedy for a tenant whose landlord failed to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. An
action for damages remained the tenant's only recourse." Id. (footnote omitted).
30. See Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 861 (stating that "[p]rior to 1826, however,
the interference by the landlord that would justify the suspension of the tenant's obligations to
pay rent had to be an actual eviction" (emphasis added)).
31. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826) (in which lessee was evicted constructively by landlord who habitually brought "lewd women" into demised premises).
32. Id. at 732 (footnote omitted).
33. See, e.g., Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 861; Note, supra note 6, at 96. It
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tenant's beneficial enjoyment of the premises, the tenant was justified
in quitting the premises
and was relieved of his obligation to pay rent
34
under the lease.

Subsequent decisions recognized a constructive eviction when the
landlord either actively 5 or by omission 36 breached the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. As the doctrine evolved, courts lessened the
required degree of interference3 7 while failing to establish clearly what
duty the lessor had violated. 3 As a result, the use of constructive eviction moved residential leasehold law away from the realm of property
law and closer to embodying contract principles.3 , Despite its expanded
scope, however, the doctrine of constructive eviction did not become a
widely used tenant remedy. This result was due to the rigorous elements that the lessee had to prove,4 ° as well as the inherent risks involved in utilizing this approach.41
In the middle of the nineteenth century the courts began to attack
the doctrine of caveat emptor. This attack, focused on the residential
setting, gained momentum at the turn of the century and continued
until the 1970's, when the vast majority of courts finally recognized the
doctrine as obsolete in the residential context. The assault consisted of
three major exceptions to the common-law rule. In situations when the
tenant was unable to inspect the premises adequately, and thus a major
should be noted that the court viewed the landlord's disturbance as a "total failure of the consideration." Dyett, 8 Cow. at 733. This case doctrinally was consistent with the idea of independent
covenants, yet, because the landlord expressly had covenanted regarding the peaceable use of the
dwelling, it was also a significant move toward the dependency of covenants.
34. Dyett, 8 Cow. at 733.
35. See, e.g., Radinsky v. Weaver, 170 Colo. 169, 460 P.2d 218 (1969); Lester v. Griffin, 57
Misc. 628, 108 N.Y.S. 580 (App. Term 1908); Bruckner v. Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790
(1929).
36. See, e.g., Berwick Corp. v. Kleinginna Inv. Corp., 143 So.2d 684 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Overstreet v. Rhodes, 213 Ga. 181, 97 S.E.2d 561 (1957); John Munic Meat Co. v. H.
Gartenberg & Co., 51 111. App. 3d 413, 366 N.E.2d 617 (1977); Tallman v. Murphy, 120 N.Y. 345, 24
N.E. 716 (1890).
37. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 96-97.
38. See Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1
DE PAUL L. REV. 69, 72-74, 79-84 (1951).
39. See J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, supra note 12, at 31-32; Note, supra note 6, at 98.
40. The tenant had to establish: (1) substantial interference with the tenant's possession, (2)
by or at the direction of the landlord, (3) that the landlord was notified of the problem, and (4) the
abandonment of the premises by the tenant within a reasonable time. See R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra
note 8, § 3:5, at 99.
41. If the tenant was mistaken as to whether the interference was substantial, he remained
liable for the rent even though he had abandoned the premises. If the tenant waited too long to
abandon, he faced the possibility that he had waived his right to do so. Finally, the tenant had to
find new livable premises for himself. See generally R. SCHosHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:5, at 99-100;
Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 867-69; Note, supra note 6, at 96-97; Note, The Implied
Warranty of Habitabilityin Landlord-Tenant Relations:A Proposalfor Statutory Development,
12 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 580, 586 (1971); Comment, supra note 6, at 1076-77.
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justification for caveat emptor was absent, two of the exceptions arose.
First, a warranty of habitability was implied in the short-term lease of
furnished premises,4 2 in which case the need for immediate occupancy
was the underlying concern."3 The second exception applied to leases
that had been executed while the demised premises were still under
construction, and similarly could not have been inspected easily.44 The
courts held the landlord to an implied warranty that the completed
structure would be suitable for the tenant's particular purpose.4 5 A final
exception addressed situations in which there had been fraudulent behavior by the lessor. The tenant would be excused from performance
under the lease if the landlord either fraudulently misrepresented the
leasehold's condition or knowingly failed to disclose latent defects
which the tenant could not discover upon reasonable inspection. 6 The
inability of these exceptions to protect the residential tenant adequately eventually prompted the vast majority of courts to abolish caveat emptor completely in the residential setting.
2.

Legislative Action

Judicial activity was the primary force behind the transformation
of the landlord-tenant relationship until the twentieth century. By the
mid-1900's, however, federal, state, and local legislatures began to get
involved. 47 On the federal level, Congress took its first major step con42. This exception had its origin in the English case of Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693
(8 Ex. 1843). The first American decision to adopt the exception was Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass.
348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892) (holding a breach of this warranty constituted defense to payment of rent).
Other jurisdictions followed suit. See, e.g., Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136
N.Y.S. 140 (Sup. Ct. 1912). This theory, however, initially was rejected by some courts. See, e.g.,
Fisher v. Lighthall, 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 82 (1885); Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394
(1888); Franklin v. Brown, 118 N.Y. 110, 23 N.E. 126 (1889). Some courts followed the doctrine of
independent covenants and held that the tenant was bound by his obligation to pay rent despite
the lessor's breach. See, e.g., Hunter v. Porter, 10 Idaho 72, 77 P. 434 (1904).
43. See generally R. ScHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:11; 1 A.L.P., supra note 18, § 3.45, at 35.
44. See generally 1 A.L.P., supra note 18, § 3.45, at 35; Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5,
at 862 n.44.
45. See, e.g., Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938);
Levitz Furniture Co. v. Continental Equities, Inc., 411 So.2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (citing other
cases in agreement), petitiondenied, 419 So.2d 1196 (Fla. 1982); J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 66 S.W.2d 676 (Tex. 1933).
46. See, e.g., Gamble-Robinson Co. v. Buzzard, 65 F.2d 950 (8th Cir. 1933); Taylor v. Leedy
& Co., 412 So.2d 763 (Ala. 1982); Grimes v. Gano, 111 Ga. App. 543, 142 S.E.2d 413 (1965);
Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902); Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542
P.2d 652 (1975); Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N.E. 117 (1887); Blake v. Dick, 15 Mont.
236, 38 P. 1072 (1895); Goldberg v. Reed, 97 N.J.L. 170, 116 A. 429 (1922); Daly v. Wise, 132 N.Y.
306, 30 N.E. 837 (1892); Pulaski Housing Auth. v. Smith, 39 Tenn. App. 213, 282 S.W.2d 213
(1955); Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934).
47. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 40-45.
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cerning residential tenancies with the Housing Act of 1949."' Soon after,
President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society program greatly increased
the availability of low-cost legal services to poor tenants.4 9 These two
developments, along with other federal action, spurred state and local
governments either to promulgate new housing codes or to amend their
existing ones. 50 From the mid-1960's the courts and local legislatures
were poised to confront and reject the common-law notions concerning
residential tenancies. Courts began to render decisions that either were
based on, or formed the basis for, legislation protecting the newly
emerging rights of tenants.
C. Present Residential Protection
In the second half of the twentieth century it increasingly became
obvious that the common-law assumptions about the landlord-tenant
relationship had little or no application under current urban conditions.
Despite a few early decisions, the first major cases to abandon the
48. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1490j (1982). The Act's goal was to realize "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family." Id. § 1441.
49. See Donahue, Change in The American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REV.
242, 246 (1974).
50. See Abbott, supra note 1, at 43-45; Cunningham, supra note 1, at 5-10, 25-51.
51. The first decision was Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The
court in Pines stated that "there was an implied warranty of habitability in the residential lease."
Id. at 594, 111 N.W.2d at 412. Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, however,
make the continued vitality of this statement unclear. See Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d 172, 18082, 174 N.W.2d 528, 532-33 (1970) (refusing to imply judicially a city housing code into residential
leases while not mentioning Pines);see also State ex rel. Michalek v. LeGrand, 77 Wis. 2d 520, 532
n.20, 253 N.W.2d 505, 509 n.20 (1977) (stating that Pines limited "a landlord's right to receive rent
where landlord fails to maintain rented premises in habitable condition"). In light of these decisions, and because Pines involved the lease of a furnished dwelling, some commentators argue that
it falls within this exception to caveat emptor. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (discussing this exception); see also R. Schoshinski, supra note 8,§ 3:16, at 124 (characterizing the court's
discussion of an implied warranty as dictum); Love, supra note 10, at 95.
Two years later, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin cited Pines for the proposition that "[t]he
covenant of possession implies . . . that the tenant will be able ... to use the premises for its

intended purpose." Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 500, 124 N.W.2d 651, 654 (1963)
(footnote omitted). Because Allen involved the construction of a leasehold and an express covenant to provide the tenant with a suitable water supply, the case more accurately belongs in the
category of the common law exception for demised premises to be built by the landlord for a
specific purpose of the prospective tenant. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing
this exception); see also Brennan, supra note 6, at 690 n.45 (stating that "[tihe court's implication
of a warranty of fitness does not appear to have been necessary for its conclusion"). The real
significance of this decision is its application of the Pines theory of residential protection in the
commercial context.
Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967) represents an intermediate step on the way to complete abandonment of the common law tradition. In Buckner, the
court expressed its distaste for caveat emptor and discussed an implied warranty of habitability.
Its final holding, however, was based on the state statutes requiring the demised premises to be
suitable for occupation.
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traditional rules and to imply a warranty of habitability in residential
leases were Lemle v. Breeden52 and Javins v. First National Realty
Corp.5 3 Lemle was the first case to make a clean break from traditional
principles and to characterize the residential lease as a contractual relationship in which the landlord implicitly warranted the habitability of
the demised premises. 5 4 Although cited more often because of its detailed and comprehensive reasoning, Javins was not an exclusively judicial action. While the court held that a warranty of habitability was
implied into residential dwellings, the warranty was based on the housing regulations of the District of Columbia and applied only to units
covered by the housing regulations.5 5 Nevertheless, with the powerful
force of these decisions behind it, the movement for greater lessee protection in the residential area swept across the nation. The vast majority of courts considering the issue have decided to imply a warranty of
habitability into residential leases. 5 6 Additionally, thirty-nine state leg52. 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
53. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
54. Lemle, 51 Haw. at 433, 462 P.2d at 474.
55. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072-73, 1081. See generally P SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:16, at
125-26.
56. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Breezewood Management Co. v.
Maltbie, 411 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v.
Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973); Detling v. Edelbrock, 671 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. 1984) (en banc); Kline v. Burns, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Tonetti V.
Penati, 48 A.D.2d 25, 367 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1975); Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289 N.E.2d 919
(1972); Pugh v. Holmes, 486 Pa. 272, 405 A.2d 897 (1979); Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658
(Tex. 1978); Birkenhead v. Coombs, 143 Vt. 167, 465 A.2d 244 (1983); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash.
2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973); Teller v. McCoy, 162 W. Va. 367, 253 S.E.2d 114 (1978); see also Pines,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409. But see Martin v. Springdale Stores, Inc., 354 So. 2d 1144 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1978); Hurst v. Feild, 281 Ark. 106, 661 S.W.2d 393 (1983) (holding landlord has no duty
to repair unless expressly provided for in the lease); Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 191 Colo. 344, 558
P.2d 563 (1976); Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972) (concluding no implied
warranty in a single family dwelling); Solomon v. Gentry, 388 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding no warranty of fitness or merchantability implied in mobile home which is considered real
property); Worden v. Ordway, 105 Idaho 719, 672 P.2d 1049 (1983) (finding no implied warranty
because legislature already had acted); Zimmerman v. Moore, 441 N.E.2d 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)
(finding no such warranty when a non-merchant lessor leases single family, used dwelling); Miles v.
Shauntee, 664 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1983) (concluding no implied warranty absent legislation to the
contrary); Cappaert v. Junker, 413 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1982) (holding no implied warranty); Paxton
v. Hinkle, 282 S.C. 273, 318 S.E.2d 123 (Ct. App. 1984) (finding landlord has no duty to repair
unless expressly provided for in the lease); Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) (personal
injury action).
The vast majority of these jurisdictions also expressly abandoned the common-law doctrine of
independent lease covenants. See, e.g., Javins, 428 F.2d 1071; Green, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d
1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704; Boston Hous. Auth., 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831; Birkenhead, 143 Vt.
167, 465 A.2d 244. These courts also allowed an aggrieved tenant to assert as a defense a breach of
the implied warranty of habitability in a summary dispossession proceeding. See, e.g., Javins, 428
F.2d at 1071; Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 616, 517 P.2d at 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 704; Boston Hous. Auth.,
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islatures have mandated that landlords can rent only habitable residential premises.5 7 As a result, forty-three jurisdictions currently afford
many or all residential tenants the protection of an implied warranty of
habitability.
The courts have emphasized several motivating factors for departing from the common law. The predominant considerations include: (1)
the shift in importance from the land to the structures and improvements on the land; (2) the difficulties and costs involved in inspecting a
potential leasehold and attempting to make repairs; (3) the disparity in
bargaining power and the resulting inequities, including the use of form
leases created by the shortage of adequate, low-cost housing; (4) the
poor enforcement of existing housing codes which reflects the public
policy promoting the maintenance of habitable dwellings; and (5) the
tendency of common-law approaches to encourage slums.5 8 Considered
363 Mass. at 184, 293 N.E.2d at 831; Birkenhead, 143 Vt. at 167, 465 A.2d at 244. But cf. Brown v.
Young, 364 A.2d 1171 (D.C. 1976) (breach of covenant concerning option to purchase residential
premises was not allowed as defense); Timber Ridge Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 338
A.2d 21 (Law Div. 1975) (holding breach of covenant to provide swimming pool was not justification for residential rent abatement).
57. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1985); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1324 (Supp. 1987); CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1941, 1941.1 (West 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-7 (1978 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, § 5303 (1974); FLA. STAT. § 83.51 (1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. §
521.42 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 6-320 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 562A.15 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-2553 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383. 595 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1986); LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. arts. 2692, 2693, 2695, 2717 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (1964 &
Supp. 1987); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-211 (1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 111, § 127A (Law.
Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1988); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 127L (Law. Co-op. 1985); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 239, § 8a (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1988); MIcH. Comp. LAWS § 554.139 (1981); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 504.18 (West Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 441.500, 441.510 (Vernon 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-24-303 (1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1419 (1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118A.290 (1987); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-88 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-20 (Supp. 1987); N.Y. MULT. DWELL.
LAW §§ 301, 302(1)(b) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW §§ 305, 305a (McKinney 1952 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Supp. 1988) (generally
applicable warranty of habitability); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 755, 770 (McKinney 1979 &
Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (Supp. 1987); N.D. CENr. CODE § 47-16-13.1 (1978); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 118 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §
91.770 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-16, 45-24-3-6
(1984 & Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-8, 32-9 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-304
(1982); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92-052 (Vernon 1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (1986 & Supp.
1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.060 (Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 37-6-30 (1985); Wis. STAT. §
704.07 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
Only the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Mississippi, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming have not implied judicially or imposed statutorily a warranty of habitability in any type of
residential premise.
58. For a general discussion of these concerns, see Javins, 428 F.2d 1071; Green, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704; Jack Spring, Inc., 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208; Kline, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248; Marini, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526. Numerous commentators also have
outlined these factors. See, e.g., 1 A.L.P., supra note 18, § 3.45, at 36; RESTATEMENT, supra note 18,
§ 5.1, at 169-70; R. SCHOSmNSKI, supra note 8, § 3:16, at 123; Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5,
at 871-72; Note, supra note 6, at 98.
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together, these concerns are compelling in the case of the urban, residential tenant and they explain the rapid acceptance of the new implied warranty of habitability.
III.

A.

COMMERCIAL LEASE LAW

The Common-Law Tradition-Rejectionof The New Warranty

In feudal times no distinction was made between commercial and
residential leases. Accordingly, the common-law doctrine of independent covenants applied with equal force to commercial tenancies.5 9 Additionally, the covenant of quiet enjoyment was available to the
residential and nonresidential lessee because it was implied into all
leases.6 0 Due to the early limitations on the covenant of quiet enjoyment,61 however, the business tenant's protection also evolved into the
remedy of constructive eviction. 2 But the commercial lessee faced the
same problems as his residential counterpart."' Even though some decisions recognized the dependence of commercial lease covenants 64 and
59. See, e.g., Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Axton (In Re Axton), 641 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir.
1981); Murphy v. Texaco, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Collins v. Shanahan, 34 Colo.
App. 82, 523 P.2d 999 (1974); Interstate Restaurants, Inc. v. Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108 (D.C. 1973);
McArdle v. Courson, 82 Ill. App. 3d 123, 402 N.E.2d 292 (1980); Yuan Kane Ing v. Levy, 26 Ill.
App. 3d 889, 326 N.E.2d 51 (1975); C & J Delivery, Inc. v. Vinyard & Lee & Partners, Inc., 647
S.W.2d 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Earbert Restaurant, Inc. v. Little Luxuries, Inc., 99 A.D.2d 734,
472 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1984). But see, e.g., Reed v. United States Postal Serv., 660 F. Supp. 178 (D.
Mass. 1987) (applying Massachusetts' law, the court held that the landlord's duty to repair was
given in exchange for the tenant's duty to pay rent based on language in the lease and recognition
by Massachusetts' courts of a trend within the state to treat these covenants as interdependent);
Westrich v. McBride, 204 N.J. Super. 550, 499 A.2d 546 (1984) (holding landlord's express covenant to heat premises and tenant's covenant to pay rent were mutually dependent); Teodori v.
Werner, 490 Pa. 58, 415 A.2d 31 (1980) (holding landlord's non-competition clause and commercial
tenant's duty to pay rent were mutually dependent); Pawco, Inc. v. Bergman Knitting Mills, Inc.,
283 Pa. Super. 443, 424 A.2d 891 (1980) (rejecting the "independence-of-obligations approach"
when landlord breached express covenant to heat premises); Davidow v. Inwood N. Professional
Group-Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988) (holding landlord's implied warranty of suitability
and tenant's covenant to pay rent mutually dependent in commercial setting); cf., e.g., Earl Millikin, Inc. v. Allen, 21 Wis. 2d 497, 124 N.W.2d 651 (1963).
60. See Stevan v. Brown, 54 Md. App. 235, 247-48, 458 A.2d 466, 473 (1983); Charles E. Burt,
Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 127, 163 N.E.2d 4, 6 (1959); Reste Realty Corp. v.
Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 456-57, 251 A.2d 268, 275-76 (1969); supra notes 24-30 and accompanying
text.
61. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
62. See Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc., 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1963); Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Ill. 196, 172 N.E. 35 (1930); CharlesE. Burt, Inc.,
340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4; Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 77,
256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970); Perkins v. Marsh, 179 Wash. 362, 37 P.2d 689 (1934); cf.
Ringwood Assocs. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 379 A.2d 508 (1977).
63. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
64. See, e.g., Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457
(1942); Groh, 221 Cal. App. 2d at 611, 34 Cal. Rptr. at 637; Westrich, 204 N.J. Super. 550, 499 A.2d
546; Pawco, Inc., 238 Pa. Super. 443, 424 A.2d 891. These decisions did not extend the broad
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other decisions relaxed the rigid requirements of constructive eviction, 5
the vast majority of jurisdictions steadfastly clung to the notion that,
absent express evidence to the contrary, commercial lease covenants
were independent. 6 Consequently, in the face of a breach of an express
covenant by the lessor, commercial lessees in the vast majority of jurisdictions had to repair the premises themselves, while still paying rent,
and then sue the lessor for damages arising out of that breach.
The nonresidential lessee also was burdened by the doctrine of caveat emptor. As the common-law courts began to carve out exceptions
to this rule,67 a bifurcation occurred in the treatment of leases. The judicial retreat from caveat emptor in property law was confined exclusively to the residential leasehold, and nonresidential tenants expressly
were denied the same protection. The most glaring examples of this
dichotomy surfaced as the overwhelming majority of courts refused to
contractual theory of mutual dependency to all of the covenants in a commercial lease. Rather,
they made it clear that the covenant which the landlord breached was the consideration for the
lease because of its crucial importance to the tenant. Thus, these cases can be read as judicial
interpretations of the lease agreement holding that the landlord's duty to perform substantially
certain express covenants was a condition of the tenant's obligation to make rental payments. The
decisions represent a greater judicial willingness to extend contract principals to commercial lease
law.
65. At least two jurisdictions have allowed a commercial tenant to remain on the premises
and file suit seeking equitable remedies and a determination of whether a constructive eviction has
occurred which would allow the tenant to abandon the premises without liability for rent. See, e.g.,
Stevan, 54 Md. App. 235, 458 A.2d 466; CharlesE. Burt, Inc., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4. While
this doctrine of equitable constructive eviction does eliminate the tenant's dilemma when the existence of a constructive eviction is unclear, it does not address the other problems that a commercial tenant faces, such as forfeiting a profitable location and re-establishing the business in a new
area. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Handley, 76 Cal. App. 3d 956, 143 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1978).
66. See cases cited supra note 59. The natural consequence of these decisions was that the
commercial lessee could not assert the lessor's breach of any lease covenant in a summary dispossession action. See, e.g., Schulman v. Vera, 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1980) (finding
breach of express covenant to repair roof could not be asserted); Halsa Corp., 309 A.2d 108. But
see, e.g., Davidow, 747 S.W.2d 373 (holding commercial tenant was allowed to assert landlord's
breach of implied warranty of habitability as a defense in an action for unpaid rent); Reed, 660 F.
Supp. 178 (in which the court, applying Massachusetts law, allowed a commercial tenant to defend
landlord's eviction action by asserting landlord's breach of express lease covenant to repair); cf.,
e.g., Warfield v. Richey, 167 Cal. App. 2d 93, 334 P.2d 101 (1959) (concluding defenses of fraudulent inducement and failure to make agreed repairs were allowed in action for summary dispossession); Teodori, 490 Pa. 58, 415 A.2d 31 (allowing commercial tenant to assert landlord's breach of
non-competition clause by landlord as defense to action for summary eviction and rent).
67. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Gade v. National Creamery Co., 324 Mass. 515, 87 N.E.2d 180 (1949) (refusing
to apply the furnished dwelling exception to business premises). But see, e.g., Warfield, 167 Cal.
App. 2d 93, 334 P.2d 101 (concluding that a commercial lessee was allowed to rescind lease because
landlord fraudulently induced him to enter it and failed to make agreed-upon repairs); Vermes v.
American Dist. Tel. Co., 312 Minn. 33, 40-41, 251 N.W.2d 101, 105 (1977) (finding that "[i]n cases
where suitability factors might not be obvious upon casual inspection ...a basic duty of the
landlord [is] to inform the prospective tenant of any qualities of the premises which might reasonably be undesirable from the tenant's point of view").
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abandon caveat emptor in the commercial context and denied business
tenants the remedy of an implied warranty of habitability.69 Additionally, almost all state legislatures have left commercial tenants to conduct their own inspection of the demised premises and to secure
express covenants from the landlord as to its suitability for use. 0
B. Signs of Uncertainty
Despite judicial reluctance to depart from the common-law doctrines of independent covenants and caveat emptor in the commercial
setting, Texas recently extended the full ambit of residential tenant
69. See, e.g., E.P. Hinkel & Co. v. Manhattan Co., 506 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Parris v.
Sinclair Regining Co., 359 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1966) (Tennessee law); Schulman, 108 Cal. App. 3d
552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620; Hoban v. Masters, 36 Conn. Supp. 611, 421 A.2d 1318 (1980); Halsa Corp.,
309 A.2d 108; J.B. Stein & Co. v. Sandberg, 95 Ill. App. 3d 19, 419 N.E.2d 652 (1981); McArdle, 82
Ill. App. 3d 123, 402 N.E.2d 292 (1980); Service Oil Co. v. White, 218 Kan. 87, 542 P.2d 652 (1975);
Buker v. National Management Corp., 16 Mass. App. Ct. 36, 448 N.E.2d 1299, appeal denied, 389
Mass. 1104, 451 N.E.2d 1167 (1983); Kootman v. Kaye, 744 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988);
Gehrke v. General Theatre Corp., 207 Neb. 301, 298 N.W.2d 773 (1980); Golub v. Colby, 120 N.H.
535, 419 A.2d 397 (1980); Coulston v. Teliscope Prods., Ltd., 85 Misc. 2d 339, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553
(App. Term 1976) (per curiam); Cappadora Realty Corp. v. Studio R, Inc., No. 102-521, slip op.
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 1987) (LEXIS, States library, Omnifile file); Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash.
App. 383, 563 P.2d 1275 (1977); cf. Axton, 641 F.2d 1262 (commercial lease covenants independent
under California law); Murphy, 567 F. Supp. 910 (commercial lease covenants are independent).
But see In re D.C. Diamond Head, Inc., 51 Bankr. 309, 312-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (urging future litigants to argue for extension of Javins' rationale to commercial tenancies); Klatman v. Barnett, 458
So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (Glickstein, J., concurring) (noting while there are meritorious
reasons to extend implied warranty of habitability to commercial tenants, task is best left to state
legislature); McArdle, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 128-29, 402 N.E.2d at 297 (Craven, J., dissenting) ("an
implied warranty of usability is included in contracts governing tenancies in commercial realty");
40 Assocs., Inc. v. Katz, 112 Misc.2d 215, 446 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Civ. Ct. 1981) (stating warranty of
fitness is implied in all commercial tenancies); Davidow, 747 S.W.2d 373 (first major decision to
extend implied warranty of suitability to commercial setting); cf. Dravillas v. Vega, 294 A.2d 363
(D.C. 1972) (see discussion infra); Reste Realty, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (see infra notes 72-78
and accompanying text); Hodgson v. Chin, 168 N.J. Super. 549, 403 A.2d 942 (App. Div. 1979)
(holding that builder-vendor extended implied warranty of quality to vendee covering entire premises in sale of combined residential and commercial building); Earl Millikin, Inc., 21 Wis. 2d 497,
124 N.W.2d 651. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, § 5.1 caveat, comment b (no position
taken regarding applicability of residential remedies to commercial tenant).
In Dravillas,the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision in favor of the tenant.
The lower court held that the landlord either misrepresented the premises or breached an "implied
warranty as to the nature and condition of the premises." Dravillas,294 A.2d at 365. The fact that
this decision affirmed an alternate holding, that the landlord still received all rent due under the
lease , and that the same court expressly rejected the implication of such a warranty one year later
in Interstate Restaurants, Inc., casts serious doubt on the current validity and scope of this
decision.
70. There are two jurisdictions whose statutes do not distinguish between residential and
nonresidential rental property. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-13 (1982); LA. CIV. CODE: ANN. art. 2695 (West
1952). While there are no Georgia decisions on point, courts expressly have applied the Louisiana
statute to commercial leases. See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Robertson, 713 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir.
1983) (applying Louisiana law); Pylate v. Inabnet, 458 So. 2d 1378 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Freeman v.
G.T.S. Corp., 363 So. 2d 1247 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
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protection to the commercial lessee in Davidow v. Inwood North Professional Group-PhaseL 1 Additionally, decisions in New Jersey, New
York, and California have evidenced a willingness to retreat from, if not
abandon, these traditional concepts. The decisions in these states are
evidence of both the existence of new judicial reasoning and the need
for a coherent, analytical framework in this field. As the framework for
analyzing landlord-tenant disputes moves further away from property
law and closer to contract principles, it is inevitable that other states
will face these controversies. Accordingly, this Note will examine the
current state of the law in New Jersey, New York, and California, which
suggests a movement toward an implied warranty of commercial
suitability.
1.

New Jersey

Exploration of the origins of an implied warranty of suitability in
commercial leases properly should begin with the New Jersey Supreme
Court's decision in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper.2 In Reste the tenant
leased the ground floor of a commercial office building to train its employees and to conduct sales meetings. After each rainfall, water
drained into the office building making it unpleasant to use the premises. After several incidents, the tenant gave notice and vacated. The
73
landlord sued for the rent due for the remainder of the lease term.
Although the court expressed its agreement with the rationale underlying the implication of a warranty of habitability in residential leases,7T
the final decision was grounded in the doctrine of constructive evic71. 747 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. 1988). In Davidow, the Texas Supreme Court held that "there is an
implied warranty of suitability by the landlord in a commercial lease that the premises are suitable
for their intended commercial purpose." The court also stated that this warranty was mutually
dependent with the tenant's obligation to pay rent. Finally, as a natural consequence of these
holdings, the tenant could assert a breach of this warranty as a defense to an action brought by the
landlord for unpaid rent. Although the lease contained a number of express clauses regarding repair obligations of the landlord, and the failure to supply essential services could have supported a
constructive eviction, the court decided not to rest its decision on these grounds. Rather, it seized
the opportunity to abandon completely traditional commercial lease doctrine. The court's opinion
constitutes the first judicial statement that separates itself from the majority view. As such, it will
be a powerful weapon for commercial tenants in future judicial battles.
72. 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
73. Id. at 447-50, 251 A.2d at 270-71.
74. In laying the foundation for its opinion, the court stated:
A prospective lessee, such as a small businessman, cannot be expected to know if the plumbing or wiring systems are adequate or conform to local codes.. . . Ordinarily all this information should be considered readily available to the lessor who can in turn inform the
prospective lessee. These factors have produced persuasive arguments for re-evaluation of the
caveat emptor doctrine and, for imposition of an implied warranty that the premises are suitable for the leased purposes .
Id. at 452, 251 A.2d at 272.
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tion.7 5 The opinion, however, used language indicating that a warranty
was implied into the lease; but this warranty was against latent defects. 7 Consequently, Reste Realty can be read broadly as a constructive eviction "plus" case. The "plus" seems to suggest that express
covenants in the lease should be mutually dependent. 77 Reste Realty,
however, does not imply a warranty of suitability in commercial
78
leases.
The following year, the New Jersey Supreme Court made two significant decisions in this area. In Marini v. Ireland79 the court extended
the full panoply of rental protection to the residential lessee. The court
discarded caveat emptor and replaced it with an implied warranty of

habitability.80 Compliance with the implied warranty of habitability

and the fulfillment of the tenant's obligation to pay rent were held to
be dependent.8 1 Finally, the court stated that a tenant could assert a
breach of the implied warranty as a defense to the nonpayment of rent
in a summary dispossession proceeding.8 2 The court in Kruvant v. Sunrise Market, Inc. established that these remedies were not available to
75. The court devoted the majority of its discussion of the tenant's action to an analysis of
the relevant elements of constructive eviction. See id. at 455-58, 251 A.2d at 274-77.
76. See id. at 455, 458, 251 A.2d at 274, 277; see also Berzito v. Gambino, 63 N.J. 460, 465,
308 A.2d 17, 20 (1973).
77. Four years later, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Berzito, explained that the language
purporting to imply a warranty against latent defects in Reste Realty was "considered dictum," 63
N.J. at 465, 308 A.2d at 20 (emphasis in original), and the Reste Realty decision rested upon the
doctrine of constructive eviction. The court noted that "Reste is probably more important for what
the opinion said and for what it forecast than for what it held." Id. This interpretation of Reste
Realty was reinforced by the Superior Court of New Jersey in Ringwood Associates, Ltd. v. Jack's
of Route 23, Inc., 166 N.J. Super 36, 44, 398 A.2d 1315, 1319 (App. Div. 1979) (stating that "our
Supreme Court has heralded, if not commanded, the demise of the doctrine of independent covenants in commercial leaseholds in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper" (citation omitted)), and was
echoed most recently in the opinions of Carisi v. Wax, 192 N.J. Super. 536, 471 A.2d 439, 443
(Bergen County Ct. 1983) (noting that Reste indicates the tendency to treat commercial leases as
contracts rather than as conveyances of land) and Westrich v. McBride, 204 N.J. Super 550, 555,
499 A.2d 546, 548 (Law Div. 1984) (stating that "[t]he Reste decision signaled the demise of the
doctrine of independent covenants in commercial leaseholds").
78. See Westrich, 204 N.J. Super. at 555, 499 A.2d at 548 (stating Reste held that "landlord's
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment justified tenant's vacation of the leased premises and
constituted a constructive eviction and a defense to the landlord's suit based on non-payment of
rent"); Berzito, 63 N.J. at 465, 308 A.2d at 20 (finding that decision in Reste based on constructive
eviction); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super 395, 403, 261 A.2d 413, 417 (Law Div.
1970); Stevan v. Brown, 54 Md. App. 235, 240-41, 458 A.2d 466, 470 (1983). But cf. Timber Ridge
Town House v. Dietz, 133 N.J. Super. 577, 581, 338 A.2d 21, 23 (Law Div. 1975) (asserting that
Reste "announced the implied warranty of habitability doctrine in a commercial leasehold setting"); Olson v. Scholes, 17 Wash. App. 383, 393, 563 P.2d 1275, 1281 (1977) (stating that the Reste
court imposed an implied warranty of habitability in commercial leases).
79. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
80. Id. at 142-43, 265 A.2d at 532-34.
81. Id. at 144, 265 A.2d at 534-35.
82. Id. at 139, 265 A.2d at 530-31.
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the commercial lessee. 83 The court distinguished Marini4 and expressly
reserved the question of whether such a warranty should be implied in
a commercial lease. 5 Consequently, the court left the issue to the lower
courts so that they could guide future developments in this area.
The lower courts in New Jersey have shown some willingness to
retreat from traditional common-law doctrine, although they have not
elected to abandon completely the familiar positions. In Demirci v.
Burns"6 the superior court held that a commercial tenant could assert
the landlord's breach of an express lease covenant as a defense in a
summary dispossession action.8 7 Demirci involved tenants in a professional office building who had placed their rental money in escrow because of the landlord's alleged breach of an express covenant to provide
adequate climate control for the demised premises. 8 The tenants
sought to raise this breach as a defense when the landlord sued for
overdue rent. Ruling for the tenants, the court relied on Reste Realty,
Marini, and Kruvant and found the particular status of the demised
premises and the fact that these "commercial tenants" were providers
of professional services to be a persuasive basis to imply a warranty of

suitability.8 9
The superior court's next decision in this area was Van Ness Industries v. Clairmont Painting& Decorating Co.9 0 The court was faced
with a commercial tenant's constitutional challenge to the New Jersey
distraint statute.9 1 The court ultimately found that the statute was unconstitutional.92 In its analysis of the tenant's argument, however, the
court made it clear that the warranty of fitness did not apply to nonresidential premises.9 While this statement was not necessary for the
83. 58 N.J. 452, 279 A.2d 104 (1970) (per curiam).
84. See id. at 456, 279 A.2d at 105-06 (noting that this lease "was negotiated at arm's length
between parties of equal bargaining power").
85. Id. at 456, 279 A.2d at 106 (adding that "[w]hen and under what circumstances [an implied warranty of suitability] should be applied in other than residential situations is a matter we
leave open for future determination in an appropriate case").
86. 124 N.J. Super. 274, 306 A.2d 468 (App. Div. 1973).
87. Id. at 276, 306 A.2d at 469.
88. Id. at 275, 306 A.2d at 468.
89. Id. at 276, 306 A.2d at 469 (stating that "[t]he present case is an appropriate one for the
use of such defense since the 'commercial tenants' are actually professional men renting relatively
small premises for the delivery of personal services").
90. 129 N.J. Super. 507, 324 A.2d 102 (Ch. Div. 1974).
91. Id. at 509, 324 A.2d at 103. New Jersey allows the landlord to seize the personal property
of a tenant for nonpayment of rent. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:33-1 to 33-23 (West 1987). This remedy
is known as distress. The tenant in Van Ness had withheld rent because of the landlord's poor
maintenance of the leasehold. Consequently, the landlord had seized some of his personal property. Van Ness, 129 N.J. Super. at 509-10, 324 A.2d at 103.
92. Van Ness, 129 N.J. Super. at 513-15, 324 A.2d at 105.
93. Id. at 513, 324 A.2d at 105.
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court's holding, and, thus, may be regarded as dicta, it does show a judicial reluctance to disclaim the viability of caveat emptor and to allow
the commercial lessee the same ambit of protection as his residential
counterpart.
Most recently, the New Jersey Superior Court in Westrich v. McBride94 was presented with a situation very similar to the one in
Demirci9 5 A commercial tenant providing professional services sought
to assert the landlord's breach of an express covenant in the lease in a
summary eviction action brought by the landlord for the nonpayment
of rent. 6 After citing the supreme court's reservation in Kruvant, the
Westrich court stated that the circumstances before it warranted an extension of the principles first enunciated in Marini in a residential setting. 7 While the superior court's decision did not go as far as Marini,

the court held that the covenants in a commercial lease were mutually
dependent and, accordingly, the tenant could raise the landlord's
breach of a covenant as a defense.9 8 Concerning the implication of a
warranty of suitability, however, the court merely echoed the "latent
defects" language of Reste Realty,9 thereby precluding the full utilization of residential remedies by the commercial lessee.100
The Westrich decision is significant in holding that the landlord's
breach of an express covenant suspends the commercial tenant's obligation to pay rent'0 1 because this ruling is a rejection of the common law
doctrine of independent covenants which forced the tenant to continue
to pay rent and sue for breach of contract. This decision, ' however,
should not be read too broadly. Even though the superior court used
some expansive language,0 2 several factors dictate a narrow interpretation of the scope of this decision. The fact that the court's underlying
rationale tracked Reste Realty very closely, as well as the size of the
commercial premises and the relative sophistication of these business
94. 204 N.J. Super. 550, 499 A.2d 546 (Law Div. 1984).
95. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. The court acknowledged this authority,
stating that "[tihe relative bargaining positions of the parties, the type of use of the premises, and
the equities involved in the breach of the lease are all quite similar [to the Demirci case]." Westrich, 204 N.J. Super. at 555, 499 A.2d at 548.
96. Westrich, 204 N.J. Super. at 552, 499 A.2d at 546-47.
97. Id. at 554, 499 A.2d at 548.
98. Id. at 556, 499 A.2d at 548.
99. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
100. Westrich, 204 N.J. Super. at 556, 499 A.2d at 548-49.
101. Id. at 556, 499 A.2d at 549.
102. See, e.g., id. at 554, 499 A.2d at 548 (stating that "[tihis court holds that the facts of the
present case are such as to permit the extension of the principles of Marini and Berzito to a
commercial lease setting"); id. at 556, 499 A.2d at 548 (noting that "this court holds that a lease,
whether it be for a residence or for commercial purposes, is a set of mutually dependent
covenants").
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tenants, counsel against a broad application of this opinion.
These lower court decisions indicate the direction that these courts
have taken since the supreme court's invitation to explore further the
potential application of residential tenants' remedies in the nonresidential setting. The decisions have moved New Jersey toward an abandonment of the residential-nonresidential distinction. The superior court
opinions have shown a judicial willingness to provide at least smaller,
less sophisticated business tenants with the protection of the contract
doctrine of mutual dependence of covenants, as well as granting these
business tenants the ability to raise the landlord's breach in a summary
dispossession action. These same decisions, however, also have demonstrated a hesitancy to discard the residential-nonresidential distinction
completely by failing to imply a warranty of suitability in commercial
leases.
2.

New York

The New York experience began similarly to the one in New
Jersey. 10 3 In Barash v. Pennsylvania Terminal Real Estate Corp.10 4 the
tenant of a commercial office building sought to establish the defense of
either a partial-actual or constructive eviction in a summary dispossession action brought by the landlord for the nonpayment of rent.105 The
tenant's claim was based on the landlord's refusal to provide after-hour
ventilation of the premises. 10 In holding for the landlord, the New
York Court of Appeals found a potential constructive eviction, but because the tenant had failed to abandon the premises, his cause of action
was insufficient at law. 107 Barash clearly indicates that this court was
unwilling to deviate from the common-law principles in a commercial
setting.
Most recently, the court of appeals decided the case of Park West
Management Corp. v. Mitchell.10 8 In Park West the court upheld the
implication of a warranty of habitability in residential leases, made the
tenant's obligation to pay rent dependent upon the landlord's compliance with this warranty, and allowed the tenant to assert noncompliance as a defense in an action for summary dispossession.1 09 Park West
103. See generally supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (describing the New Jersey Supreme Court's disposition of the Reste Realty case).
104. 26 N.Y.2d 77, 256 N.E.2d 707, 308 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1970).
105. Id. at 80-82, 256 N.E.2d at 708-09, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 651-52.
106. Id. Unlike Reste Realty, this lease did not contain an express covenant addressing ventilation. Instead, the tenant alleged oral assurances by the landlord. Id.
107. Id. at 86, 256 N.E.2d at 711, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 655-56.
108. 47 N.Y.2d 316, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 418 N.Y.S.2d 310, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
109. Id. at 325-30, 391 N.E.2d at 1292-95, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 314-17.
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represents the final judicial step in discarding the traditional commonlaw rules as they applied to residential leases. It did not provide any
real guidance, however, for the lower courts facing the same issue in
nonresidential situations.
Despite one earlier decision,1 10 the greatest development in the
commercial arena has occurred since Park West in New York's lower
courts. The most revolutionary decision, 40 Associates, Inc. v. Katz,"'
occurred in the Civil Court of the City of New York which held that
there was an implied warranty of fitness for commercial purposes, that
the tenant's rent should be abated for its breach, and that such a
breach could be asserted as a counterclaim in a summary dispossession
action notwithstanding an express waiver of all counterclaims in the
lease. In Katz the civil court relied heavily on the restated reasoning of
Reste Realty and Park West and made no attempt to distinguish Coulston. The court also failed to make any distinction between residential
and nonresidential premises in coming to its conclusion. Accordingly,
the opinion lacks persuasiveness and has failed to attract subsequent
support.
Two significant reasons explain why Katz's status as "good law" is,
at best, questionable. First, and most importantly, later decisions construing New York law uniformly have come to the opposite conclusion.
Two years after Katz, in Randall Co. v. Alan Lobel Photography,
Inc.," 2 the civil court noted in dicta"1 3 that the warranty of habitability
had not been implied in commercial leases11 4 and that clauses waiving
tenants' counterclaims had been "consistently upheld" in commercial
leases. 1 5 Similarly, the civil court in Kachian v. Aronson"' stated in
110. See Coulston v. Teliscope Prods., Ltd., 85 Misc. 2d 339, 340-41, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554
(App. Term. 1975) (per curiam) (holding the doctrine of rent abatement for breach of implied
warranty of habitability does not apply to corporate tenant under commercial lease).
111. 112 Misc. 2d 215, 216, 446 N.Y.S.2d 844, 845 (Civ. Ct. 1981).
112. 120 Misc. 2d 112, 465 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Civ. Ct. 1983).
113. The decision involved the validity of a clause in a residential lease waiving the tenant's
right to assert counterclaims in a summary proceeding.
114. Randall Co., 120 Misc. 2d at 112, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 489. The court cited Rockefeller
Center, Inc. v. La Parfumerie Marco Corp., N.Y.L.J., July 6, 1981, at 5, col. 1 (App. Term Jan. 23,
1981) as authority for this proposition. In Rockefeller Center, the court stated that it did not read
Park West "as necessarily foreshadowing an intention on the part of [the Court of Appeals] to
modify traditional rules governing commercial tenancies." Id. The court, after citing Barash, held
that the landlord's breach of an express covenant in the lease "did not suspend tenant's independent obligation to pay the contracted-for rent while it remained in possession." Id. (citation omitted). The Rockefeller Center decision, therefore, demonstrates the continued vitality of the
common law doctrine of independent covenants. The fact that the Randall court cited Rockefeller
Center instead of Katz further negates the strength of the Katz holding.
115. Randall Co., 120 Misc. 2d at 113, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 490. This statement also directly
contradicts one prong of the holding in Katz.
116. 123 Misc. 2d 743, 475 N.Y.S.2d 214 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
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dicta that the warranty of habitability did not apply to commercial
premises.11 This court also ignored the Katz decision, citing instead
the two other lower court opinions. 8 Additionally, the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut, in Middletown Plaza Associates v. Dora Dale of Middletown, Inc.," 9 recently noted that New
York law requires that the commercial tenant be evicted constructively
in order to have a valid defense in an action for the nonpayment of
rent. 1 0° This statement is at odds with the premise of Katz. In fact no
subsequent decision has cited Katz for any part of its holding. Additionally, the Katz court overlooked the existing precedent 2 ' on this issue and embarked on a course of judicial independence in writing
essentially new law in this area. For these reasons, the current viability
of the Katz holding is highly suspect.
Because the Katz opinion has not been overruled expressly by a
higher court, any statement on the status of current commercial lease
law in New York necessarily is subject to the contrary authority that
this decision carries. In light of the overwhelming one-sidedness of the
decisions as a whole, it seems safe to say that New York remains rooted
firmly in traditional, common-law ground. This state has not shown
signs of accepting the notion that smaller, less sophisticated business
tenants are suitable candidates for at least some of the current residential remedies. Rather, with one glaring exception, the New York lower
court decisions firmly embrace the time-tested doctrines of independence of covenants and caveat emptor. Given the lack of a decision by
the court of appeals in this area, as well as the existence of Katz, the
state of New York lease law remains unacceptably uncertain. New
117. Id. at 747, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 218. This case also involved a residential dispute. In reaching
its holding, the court noted that because one quarter of the rental space was used for commercial
purposes, the residential tenants were entitled to a maximum rent abatement of 75%. Thus, the
court neatly excised the commercial nature of one part of the dwelling from further consideration.
Id. at 748, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 218-19.
118. The court cited Bomze v. Jaybee Photo Suppliers, Inc., 117 Misc. 2d 957, 460 N.Y.S.2d
862 (App. Term 1983) and 230 Park Ave. Assocs. v. Term Indus., Inc., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 6,
col. 3 (App. Term March 18, 1981) as support. Bomze involved a nonpayment proceeding under a
commercial lease. The court did not mention Katz and stated that a warranty of habitability had
not been applied to commercial property. Bomze, 117 Misc. 2d at 958, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 863. In 230
Park Ave., the court stated that covenants in a business lease were independent and that no implied warranty of habitability would be read into these leases. 230 Park Ave., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11,
1982, at 6, col. 4. Significantly, both courts cited Rockefeller Center as supporting this conclusion.
119. 621 F. Supp. 1163 (D. Conn. 1985) (applying New York law in dispute involving commercial lease).

120. Id. at 1165. The court also directly contradicted Katz in holding that New York law will
enforce contractual waivers of a tenant's right to assert counterclaims. Id. at 1166.
121. See 230 Park Ave., N.Y.L.J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 6, col. 3; Rockefeller Center, N.Y.L.J.,
July 6, 1981, at 5, col. 1; Coulston v. Teliscope Prods., Ltd., 85 Misc. 2d 339, 378 N.Y.S.2d 553
(App. Term 1975) (per curiam).
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York's highest court should clear up the current confusion as soon as it
is practicable.
3.

California

In Green v.Superior Court12 the California Supreme Court extended the full ambit of leasehold remedies to the residential tenant.
The court held that the implied warranty of habitability that existed in
residential leases could be asserted in an action brought for summary
dispossession.1 2 3 Additionally, the tenant's payment of rent was mutually conditioned on the landlord's fulfillment of the obligations imposed
by this warranty. 24 Because the decision concerned a residential lease,
Green left open the question of whether any of these principles would
be applied to commercial parties. Subsequent decisions of the lower
courts of appeal have resulted in inconsistent answers to this question.
The First District Court of Appeals had the first opportunity to
address this issue. In 1976 the court decided Golden v. Conway"2 5 and
noted in dicta that the underlying rationale of Green was "pursuasive
[sic] . . . [in] a small commercial outlet.' 26 Because the tenant in
Golden was asserting a cross-complaint against the landlord for fire
damage to his personal property based on alternative theories of strict
liability and negligence, the court was not faced directly with the commercial question.
The court's second pronouncement on commercial tenant remedies
occurred in Four Seas Investment Corp. v. InternationalHotel Tenants' Association. 27 In Four Seas the landlord instituted an unlawful
detainer action against the tenants in his hotel and they asserted the
defense of retaliatory eviction.128 The court held for the landlord on this
issue. 2 9 In addressing the tenants' claim for damages resulting from the
hotel's substandard conditions, the court noted that the lease was primarily residential and, thus, the implied warranty of habitability was
applicable. 3 0 Finally, the court stated in dictum that under the proper
circumstances, this warranty could apply to small commercial busi122. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
123. Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718. The California statute, as well as
California decisions, describes this proceeding as an unlawful detainer action. See CAL. CIv. PROC.
CODE §§ 1161-1174 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
124. Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 635, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
125. 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
126. Id. at 962, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
127. 81 Cal. App. 3d 604, 146 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1978).
128. Id. at 608-09, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33.
129. Id. at 610, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 533-34.
130. Id. at 612-13, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 535.

1078

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1057

nesses under its earlier decision in Golden."" In Four Seas the First
District Court of Appeals appeared to be setting the stage for the implication of a warranty of suitability in the leases of commercial tenancies,
at least in those commercial tenancies that are the most similar to their
residential counterparts.
This trend came to an abrupt halt two years later with the Fourth
District Court of Appeals' decision in Schulman v. Vera.132 The tenant
in Schulman operated a restaurant in a commercial building under a
lease which provided expressly that the landlord would, after receiving
notice, repair the roof, exterior walls, and paved areas.133 Due to a dispute on the amount of real property taxes that had accrued under the
lease, and the lessee's refusal to pay the full tax amount, the lessor instituted an unlawful detainer action.'3 The lessee attempted to raise
the affirmative defense that the lessor had breached the express covenant to repair the roof under the lease. 35 The trial court did not allow
the assertion of this defense and the court of appeals affirmed, holding
that the landlord's breach of an express covenant to repair in a commercial lease could not be asserted as a defense in an unlawful detainer
3 6

action.1

The true significance of the Schulman opinion is not its holding
but the reasoning the court used to reach its decision. The court examined the rationale of the holding in Green, which allowed a residential tenant to raise the breach of the implied warranty of habitability in
an action for summary dispossession,3 7 to determine if similar considerations should apply to commercial tenancies. The court found the
Green rationale inapplicable to the case at bar because, due to their
greater bargaining power and financial means, commercial lessees are
better able to protect their legal rights.3 8 Based on these distinctions,
131. Id. at 613, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 535 (stating that "the warranty of habitability could, since
Golden ....
extend to small commercial operations if the facts warranted, which they do not"
(citation omitted)).
132. 108 Cal. App. 3d 552, 166 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1980).
133. Id. at 555-56, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 621-22.
134. Id. at 556-57, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
135. Id. at 557, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 622. The lessee sought to introduce evidence that the roof
had leaked consistently, causing one puddle two inches deep and requiring the lessee to place
buckets on the restaurant's tables. Id.
136. Id. at 563, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 626 (holding that "[t]he trial court correctly concluded that
lessees' claim was not properly litigable in the unlawful detainer proceeding" (emphasis added)).
The court based its holding on two grounds: (1) the nonapplicability of the Green rationale in a
commercial setting; and (2) the need to preserve the summary nature of an unlawful detainer
proceeding. See generally id. at 560-63, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 624-26.
137. See Green, 10 Cal. 3d at 637, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
138. Schulman, 108 Cal. App. 3d at 561, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (stating that "[tihe parties are
more likely to have equal bargaining power, and, more importantly, a commercial tenant will presumably have sufficient interest in the demised premises to make needed repairs and the means to
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the court stated that the supreme court in Green intended for the decision to apply only to residential leases. 3 Several subsequent appellate
court decisions have focused on this language and asserted, incorrectly,
that Schulman stands for the proposition that the defense of breach of
an implied warranty of habitability cannot be asserted by a commercial
tenant in an unlawful detainer action. 4 0 While the Schulman court's
distinction of Green may be persuasive, Schulman did not preclude a
commercial tenant from raising the defense of breach of an implied
warranty of habitability in an unlawful detainer action.' 4 1 Beyond the
apparent interpretive inconsistencies, however, Schulman remains significant for its unqualified reversal of the emerging trend in the Califor142
nia courts of appeal.
The most recent California decision in this area is from the Second
District Court of Appeals. In Muro v. Superior Court"4 3 the court faced
the issue of whether a landlord who leases commercial property should
be strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by latent defects on the
premises, as was the lessor of residential property. Once again, the
court's analysis was more important than the actual holding of the case.
The court, in deciding not to extend the strict liability theory from residential to commercial premises, 4 4 analogized to the similar question of
whether a warranty of habitability should be implied in commercial
leases. While the court briefly mentioned both Golden"'5 and Schulman, 4 it engaged in its own analysis on the issue. For several reasons,
the Muro court found no support for the extension of an implied warranty of suitability to commercial leases."4 Although this reasoning was
make the needed repairs himself or herself, if necessary, and then sue the lessor for damages").
139. See id. at 560, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (agreeing with lessor's contention that "the Green
decision did not and was not intended to alter the well-established law relating to commercial
leases"); id. at 561, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 625 (concluding that "[i]t is our conclusion that the Green
decision is and was intended by the [supreme court] to be restricted to residential leases").
140. See Muro v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 1098, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) (second district); Fish Constr. Co. v. Moselle Coach Works, Inc., 148 Cal. App. 3d
654, 658, 196 Cal. Rptr. 174, 176 (Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (second district); Kemp v. Schultz, 121 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 13, 16 n.1, 175 Cal. Rptr. 412, 414 n.1 (1981); cf. Custom Parking, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 138 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100, 187 Cal. Rptr. 674, 681 (Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (first district) (stating
that "[t]he sound analysis of Schulman reveals that there is some validity to the commercial/
residential distinction").
141. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. It seems clear, however, that the actual
holding of Schulman, combined with the broad statements rejecting an extension of Green to commercial tenancies, allows this statement to be drawn as a logical inference from the decision.
142. It is significant that neither the Schulman court nor any subsequent decision until
Muro even mentioned Golden or Four Seas on this point.
143. 184 Cal. App. 3d 1089, 229 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1986).
144. Id. at 1097-98, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
145. Id. at 1095 n.3, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.3.
146. Id. at 1098, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
147. See id. at 1097-99, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89. The court's analysis disclosed these distin-
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used to reach a parallel holding on tort liability, and, thus, properly can
be considered dicta, it will be influential as future California courts
grapple with this issue.
As a result of the recent decisions in Schulman and Muro, the
rhetoric of Golden and Four Seas appears to be moot. Schulman, expressly and by implication, foreclosed the commercial tenant's right to
assert the landlord's breach of both express and implied lease covenants. Muro's well-developed reasoning and Schulman's distinction of
Green are persuasive authority for not extending the implied warranty
of habitability to commercial leases. These two opinions also effectively
deny the remaining residential remedy, that of the mutual dependency
of lease covenants. Thus, while the California courts of appeal initially
indicated a willingness to extend Green to some commercial tenancies,
recent decisions seemingly have quashed the movement away from
traditional common-law doctrine sub silentio. Accordingly, the situation
is ripe for the California Supreme Court to resolve the apparent conflict
in the lower courts.
C.

The Policy Considerations

In the vast majority of jurisdictions, legislative and judicial action
has shown an increased willingness to alter the traditional common-law
rules affecting residential leases. Rather than continuing to view the
lease as a conveyance of an estate in land subject to property law, the
modern approach treats the residential lease as a set of mutually dependent covenants and refuses to subject the tenant to the long-favored
maxim of caveat emptor.148 As a result, the modern residential lessee
has three-pronged protection. First, the lessor implicitly warrants that
the premises will be fit for human occupation. 4 9 Second, subject to the
contract notion of substantial performance, this implied warranty and
all express covenants made by the landlord are mutually dependent on
the tenant's obligation to pay rent. 5" Finally, if the landlord institutes
an action for summary dispossession, the tenant can raise the breach of
any lease covenant as a defense and is not forced to sue separately for
guishing factors: (1) the greater sophistication of the commercial tenant; (2) the equality of bargaining position and resultant negotiation of lease provisions between commercial parties; (3) the
lack of a strong public policy with respect to commercial buildings; (4) the availability of commercial property; and (5) the financial ability of commercial tenants. Id.
148. See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text (summarizing developments that undermined the common law foundation of caveat emptor).
149. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. For an argument that this process of applying contract analysis to landlord-tenant law may hinder true reform of the law in this area, see
Humbach, The Common-Law Conception of Leasing: Mitigation,Habitability, and Dependence
of Covenants, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 1213 (1983).
150. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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contractual damages. 151 Thus, in most jurisdictions the residential
lessee has available a broad and potent package of remedies.
These sweeping changes have not altered significantly the commonlaw rules regarding commercial leases. With very few exceptions, judicial decisions and statutory provisions have limited their reach to the
residential field. 152 In the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions the
commercial lessee still labors under the restrictions of the common-law
doctrines of independence of covenants and caveat emptor.151 Consequently, if the landlord's breach is not substantial enough to constitute
a constructive eviction, or if this remedy is impractical, the tenant
under a commercial lease must remedy the problem himself and then
sue the landlord in contract for damages. If the lessee decides to withhold rent and the lessor brings a summary dispossession action, the
lessee will not be allowed to raise the lessor's breach as a defense. While
many commentators have urged the rejection of this distinction, especially in the case of smaller commercial tenancies, an analysis of the
three separate prongs of residential protection reveals that the duality
of treatment still is warranted to some extent.
1. The Implied Warranty
At first glance, it would seem that the same societal changes that
led the courts in the residential arena to question the vitality of caveat
emptor are equally applicable in a commercial context.15 4 The commercial tenant, especially the lessee of office space, is more concerned about
the building that he occupies than the land on which it sits. Additionally, some business lessees may be no more knowledgeable than a residential lessee about inspecting the premises for defects in plumbing,
wiring, and climate control systems or about making repairs. A closer
examination of the factors that prompted the courts to imply a warranty of habitability in residential leases,'15 however, reveals that the
same arguments are not as compelling in the commercial context.
As noted earlier, the nonresidential tenant also has a strong interest in the structures on the land. This interest, however, does not exist
for the many lessees who derive locational benefits. Additionally, the
interest in the existing structures is not a sufficient reason to discard
the common-law rule because these tenants have a greater ability to
protect their interests than their residential counterparts. The commer151.
152.

See supra note 56.
See supra notes 57, 70 and accompanying text.

153. See supra notes 66, 69, 70 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (listing the major rationales for applying a
warranty of habitability to residential units).

155. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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cial tenant is in a better position to inspect the premises, or hire a
knowledgeable third party to do so and to pass this expense on to his
customers as a cost of doing business. Due to the profit motive, which
constitutes a driving force behind the acquisition of business space, the
process of acquisition is conducted in a more rational, measured manner. Additionally, because of the greater availability of business
space,156 potential lessees are not forced to accept a unit that falls below
their expectations. Finally, once on the premises, the commercial tenant
is better able to take care of any necessary repairs by virtue of his
stronger bargaining position and greater financial resources. 157 Consequently, because of the business tenant's dissimilar economic motivation, 158 the common-law concept that a lease is essentially a conveyance
of an interest in land continues to have some validity in the commercial
context. The nonresidential tenant simply is less dependent on the dayto-day services that the landlord can supply.
Perhaps the strongest reason for not implying a warranty of suitability into the commercial lease is the greater equality of bargaining
power in the business arena. Given the availability of rental space, the
general need for longer rental terms, the ability to offer greater rental
returns, and the sophistication of the parties involved, these leases are
usually the product of careful, evenly balanced negotiations. 5 9 The resulting terms are often much more in the tenant's favor than the terms
of the standard form residential agreement. The obligation to maintain
public areas and mechanical systems usually is placed on the landlord.6 0 Additionally, the importance to the landlord of retaining commercial tenants, especially larger ones, for their steady income stream
and ability to attract other business to the area by their success means
that these tenants usually can influence the landlord through extrajudicial pressures to comply with the lease covenants. The bargaining inequities produced by the residential leasehold market simply are not
present in the vast majority of commercial rental transactions.
The two remaining concerns, the evidence of a strong public policy
156. Currently, numerous cities are experiencing the growing pains of unrented commercial
space. See Otherwise Occupied, REGARDIES, Aug. 1988, at 86 (indicating that the nationwide office
occupancy rate rose in mid-1988 for the first time in six and one half years to 81.6%); see also
Aaron, The Impossible Dream Comes True: The New Tax Reform Act, BROOKiNGs REV., Winter
1987 at 3, 10 (noting 20% vacancy rate for offices in many cities).
157. As a proportion of rent payments, the cost of repairs is smaller. Additionally, in many
cases the commercial lessee temporarily can absorb this cost and seek later reimbursement from
the lessor through judicial or nonjudicial action.
158. The current commercial lessee is similar to the leaseholder in agrarian times, whose
interest was in making a living from the land.
159. See 4 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORN A REAL ESTATE § 27:75, at 365
(1977).
160. See id.
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in favor of habitable premises and the tendency of the common-law rule
to produce slum units, do not exist in the nonresidential setting. As
noted previously, the overwhelming majority of state statutes limit
their application to residential dwellings;161 thus, the legislatively
promulgated public policy of protecting lessees from overreaching lessors is absent. Additionally, the common-law rule has not been shown
to be a factor in the production of run-down business tenancies. As will
be discussed later in this Note, the implication of an implied warranty
actually creates the substantial risk of promoting commercial
delapidation.
In addition to the lack of a compelling policy rationale for the implication of an implied warranty of suitability in commercial leases,
there are several potential disadvantages that also counsel against such
an extension. Rental costs will increase as the lessor passes on the expected outlays because of the implication of the warranty to the tenant.16 Assuming that the lessor's estimates are accurate, this increase
in rent roughly will translate into the lessee paying for his own repairs
on an installment plan."6 3 There is no need for the warranty if this occurs. Additionally, the tenants who arguably need the protection of an
implied warranty the most would be hit the hardest. Smaller commercial lessees with less capital to start up their companies or keep them
running would be forced to allocate a disproportionate amount of their
resources to rental payments. These tenants' choice to utilize scarce
capital resources on nonrepair expenses effectively would be curtailed.
Finally, to the extent that the landlord could not pass on all of the cost
of this warranty protection to the tenant, his margin of profit would
decrease. Property that is on the edge of profitability would be abandoned as unrentable. 1 " In turn, urban decay would accelerate, forcing
current tenants to relocate. Because of the absence of the extensive
161. See supra note 70 (listing the only two current exceptions).
162. The available empirical evidence in the residential setting indicates that habitability
laws generally tend to increase rentals charged. Unfortunately, only a few indigent tenants (mainly
the elderly) receive benefits in increased housing quality equal to or in excess of rental increases.
In fact, the studies suggest that these laws have been counterproductive. See Hirsch, From "Food
for Thought" to "EmpiricalEvidence" About Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1984); Hirsch, Hirsch & Margolis, Regression Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALiF.
L. R-v. 1098, 1133-36 (1975).
163. It is at least arguable that, due to the uncertainty of the scope of an implied warranty of
suitability, the landlord's forecasts would not correspond accurately to his actual costs. Accordingly, the increased rentals would produce an economically inefficient allocation of resources. Additionally, it is more likely that the landlord would err on the conservative side, actually
overcharging the tenant compared to what the tenant would pay if he made his own repairs.
164. See Meyers, The Covenant of Habitabilityand the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 879. 889-93 (1975).
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statutory regulations in the commercial context, this process is much
more likely to happen.
2.

Dependent Covenants and Summary Dispossession

Under the common-law rule, the doctrine of independent covenants
initially did not disadvantage the lessee. The continuing obligation of
the tenant to pay rent in the face of a material breach by the landlord
was mirrored by the fact that the landlord could not recover possession
based on the tenant's nonpayment of rent. 165 With the enactment of
statutory dispossession actions, however, this doctrine did work a hardship because the landlord could regain possession of the demised premises even if he had breached express lease covenants.6 6 This inequity
eventually was eradicated in the residential area by the judicial abolition of the doctrine of independent covenants and the resultant ability
of tenants to raise the breach of the implied warranty of habitability in
summary dispossession proceedings.6 7 These final two prongs of residential protection inexplicably have remained unavailable to the commercial lessee.6 8
The notion that all lease covenants are dependent and that a tenant should be able to raise a material breach thereof as a defense in an
action for possession should be extended to the nonresidential situation.6 9 If it is true that commercial parties are more sophisticated, and
that their negotiations produce a more accurate reflection of their intent, then the courts should not be hesitant to enforce that bargain. For
example, if the tenant has bargained for an express clause placing the
obligation to heat the premises on the landlord, the latter should not be
able to ignore this obligation and still demand full payment of rent on
the threat of dispossession. Rather, the tenant's duty to pay rent similarly should be suspended. This result would be an especially effective
bargaining chip for the smaller commercial operation that does not
have the financial resources to absorb the repair cost and engage in protracted litigation for reimbursement. The doctrine of mutually dependent lease covenants should be tempered by the contractual notion of
substantial performance. In this way, a technical breach by either party,
although often overlooked in practice, would not become the legal basis
for interrupting a functioning agreement.
165. See supra note 14.
166. See supra note 14.
167. See supra note 56.
168. See supra notes 59, 66 and accompanying text.
169. See generally 1 i. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, § 1.1, at 3-6 (arguing strenuously to abolish the "absurd" doctrine of independent covenants); R. SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 8, § 3:29, at 14849.
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Summary dispossession actions are necessary devices in current
rental disputes. Their effectiveness depends on their ability to provide
the landlord with a quick, short-term remedy by limiting the dispute to
issues directly affecting possession. This procedure, however, is not justified in any context when the landlord actually has breached an express lease covenant. In this situation, the tenant's right to litigate this
issue appears clear. As the evidence of a breach becomes less overwhelming, however, the advantages of the summary nature of the proceeding eventually outweigh the tenant's interest. The landlord should
not be faced with unwarranted delay simply because the tenant can
make a colorable claim of breach. This potential problem can be mitigated in two ways. First, the court must use its discretion to determine
whether litigation of the claim justifies frustrating the summary nature
of the proceeding. Second, the procedural mechanism should mandate
that the tenant make full rental payments to the court while his right
to setoff is being litigated. The landlord also should have limited access
to these funds during the litigation on a need basis. After all, the landlord may need these same payments to effect the disputed repairs. Because these solutions appear workable, the tenant's right to assert the
landlord's breach of a lease covenant should be preserved in most cases.
3.

The Small Commercial Operation

In arguing to extend an implied warranty of suitability to commercial lessees, the commentators specifically have focused on the smaller,
less sophisticated business tenant as the most compelling case. 70 While
it is true that this tenant generally will have less bargaining power and
financial ability than the large industrial lessee, these considerations do
not counsel for the imposition of a commercial warranty of fitness for
these tenants alone. Such a device would be difficult to implement because it is not easy to draw an appropriate line of application in the
commercial spectrum. Although a balancing test could be used to weigh
all the various factors, any balancing test inherently is subject to manipulation to achieve the desired result. In addition, the competing factors involved, including size and available capital, may be arbitrary
indicators while other factors, such as bargaining power and business
reputation, are extremely difficult to measure. Consequently, a balancing test would produce uncertain results, which especially would be
costly in the business world in which a large degree of certainty in lease
transactions is an integral part of the economic process. Because it cannot be applied fairly in a uniform manner to all tenants, an implied
warranty of fitness should be rejected completely in the commercial
170.

See supra note 6.
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context.
These concerns, however, do point out the need for some protection
for smaller businessmen. As indicated previously, that protection can be
provided through the dual devices of establishing mutually dependent
lease covenants and granting the ability to assert the breach of these
covenants in a summary proceeding on possession. Additionally, the
courts should follow the lead of decisions that have relaxed the requirements for constructive eviction, 171 thereby providing aid to the tenant
by finding a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment despite
the fact that the lease does not contain an express covenant by the
landlord to repair. In the case of the truly disadvantaged lessee who
finds himself trapped in a complex, technical web of restrictions favoring the lessor, the courts should feel free to call this type of an agreement by its proper name: a contract of adhesion. In this situation the
courts should use the doctrines of contra proferentem and unconscionability to provide appropriate relief.172 These familiar doctrines would
allow the courts to provide fair results with a higher degree of certainty
and uniformity.
A final reason for rejecting an implied warranty of suitability in
commercial leases is that even its staunchest supporters admit that the
parties should be free to write the warranty out of their agreement. 173
171. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
172. In interpreting a lease involving a small, unsophisticated commercial tenant and a
larger, more sophisticated landlord, the courts have several well-established doctrines of interpretation available to allow them to reach equitable results. First, the lease could be interpreted using
contra proferentem. Under this approach, an ambiguity in the contract generally is resolved in
favor of the party who did not draft the agreement. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 11,
§ 559; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS].
This approach has precedent in the commercial context. See, e.g., Wilner's, Inc. v. Fine, 153 Ga.
App. 591, 266 S.E.2d 278 (1980) (limitation of liability clauses construed against landlord as
drafter of lease). Second, the courts could use the similar contract of adhesion approach. This
doctrine applies to standard form contracts in which there is no opportunity to negotiate the
terms. The contract of adhesion approach is a more severe rule than contra proferentem in that it
calls for the interpretation of all ambiguities against the draftsman. See generally 3 A. CORBIN,
supra note 11, §§ 559A to 5591 (Supp. 1984). Although the traditional view presumptively considers these contracts to be fair, see id. at § 559H, at least one commentator argues that all adhesive
terms should be assumed to be unfair until proven otherwise. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1174, 1243-48 (1983).
Finally, the courts either could strike down the entire lease or excise the offending terms as
unconscionable. See generally RESTATEMENT CONTRACTS, supra, § 208. In this situation, the general
test is whether there exists an absence of meaningful choice in addition to unreasonably favorable
contract terms. Id. comment d. This doctrine has been applied with some success to residential
leases, see, e.g., Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County Ct.),
afl'd, 84 Misc. 2d 782, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (App. Term 1975) (per curiam); Seabrook v. Commuter
Hous. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 6, 338 N.Y.S.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972), but it has not enjoyed use where the
parties roughly are equivalent in bargaining power. See, e.g., Graziano v. Tortora Agency, 78 Misc.
2d 1094, 359 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Civ. Ct. 1974).
173. See Greenfield & Margolies, supra note 5, at 887; Note, supra note 5, at 954.
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This view is based on the twin notions of freedom of contract and the
efficient operation of the free market system. Assuming that these powerful doctrines dictate that a landlord should be able to disclaim this
warranty, then a most severe inequity will be worked in the guise of
fairness and equality. The large industrial tenant, who does not need
implied warranty protection because of its financial means and ability
to extract express covenants from the landlord, will be able to use its
leverage to avoid a disclaimer if it so desires. The smaller, less sophisticated tenant, the one who these commentators seek to protect because
of his asserted inferior bargaining position and inadequate resources,
would be unable to escape signing the standard form lease which would
include a disclaimer of the implied warranty. As a result, accepting both
premises leads to the inexorable conclusion that a warranty of suitability would be unavailable to those whom it was designed to protect most.
Alternatively, uniform application of the other two prongs of residential
protection to commercial tenants would afford all tenants a greater degree of security.
IV. CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, lease law was based on
the common-law doctrines that had shaped it since feudal times. As the
nineteenth century wore on, however, changing societal conditions
prompted the courts to carve out exceptions to the traditional rules.
With the arrival of the most recent exceptions, the courts began to distinguish between the residential and commercial tenancy. Legislatures
in the twentieth century also focused their protective gaze almost exclusively on the residential tenant. As a result, the full ambit of rental
protection is not available to nonresidential lessees. Sound policy distinctions between the two tenancies rationally have dictated this divergent treatment.
The current commercial tenant, however, is not so different from
his residential counterpart that he fairly can be denied any protection
at all. The dissimilarities dictate confining the broadest remedy, an implied warranty of habitability, to the residential sphere. The differences, however, do not support persuasive arguments for preventing the
application of the remainder of residential remedies to commercial tenancies. When parties to a commercial lease set down their agreement
after negotiating as relative equals, their binding covenants should be
given equal effect. Accordingly, the contract doctrine of mutual dependency should govern commercial leases. This doctrine often would be
meaningless if the tenant could not assert the breach of a lease covenant as a defense in a summary dispossession proceeding. The threat of
dispossession is a powerful weapon even if the aggrieved tenant has an
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adequate remedy at law in a subsequent suit. Accordingly, subject to
the guidelines previously detailed in this Note, these proceedings generally should allow the assertion of such defenses. The combination of
these two remedies will provide commercial lessees with adequate protection of their legal interests while avoiding the potential disadvantages and inequities of the implication of a warranty of suitability in
nonresidential leases.
Fred William Bopp III

